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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 17-3611
___________
TYRONE M. ADKINS; SHERRE ADDUSSALAAM;
RASHELL THOMPSON; NATHAN THOMPSON

v.
DETECTIVE DALLAS REYNOLDS, Troop 4 Delaware
State Police; DETECTIVE DANNAILE REMENTER, Troop 4
Delaware State Police; GOVERNER TASK FORCE MEMBERS;
TACTICAL TEAM (SERT) MEMBERS
Tyrone M. Adkins,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D. Del. No. 1-15-cv-00882)
District Judge: Honorable Gregory M. Sleet
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
March 9, 2018
Before: CHAGARES, GREENAWAY, JR. and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: June 1, 2018)
_________
OPINION*
_________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

PER CURIAM
Pro se plaintiff-appellant Tyrone Adkins appeals the District Court’s dismissal of
his case for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).
Because we conclude that this appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily
affirm the District Court’s judgment. See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
In October 2015, Adkins filed a pro se complaint raising claims pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983 against numerous defendants. Defendants answered his complaint and
submitted their initial discovery disclosures. After the District Court set a scheduling
order, defendants sought to take a deposition of Adkins, who was incarcerated, and filed
several requests for discovery from him. Adkins did not respond to the discovery
requests or seek any discovery.
The District Court granted defendants leave to take Adkins’ deposition. Shortly
after, Adkins filed a motion for the appointment of counsel, which the District Court
denied. Two months later, at his brief deposition, Adkins refused to answer any
questions posed by defendants’ counsel unless he had a lawyer present. Adkins
acknowledged that his request for the appointment of counsel had been denied and
vaguely suggested that he was hoping to secure counsel another way. 1 Adkins insisted
that his complaint was self-explanatory and refused to provide any of the discovery

1

Adkins later seemed to indicate that he was still expecting the District Court to appoint
him counsel at some point despite the prior denial of his motion for counsel. He
recognized that he had not filed any other requests for counsel with the Court.
2

sought by defendants.
Defendants filed a motion urging the District Court to dismiss Adkins’ case for
failure to prosecute. Four months later, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment
based solely on the evidence in their possession, as Adkins had still not provided any
discovery to them. The District Court issued an order for Adkins to show cause why his
case should not be dismissed for failure to prosecute, noting that Adkins had not taken
any action on his case between June 9, 2016 and February 1, 2017. Adkins then filed a
response to defendants’ motion to dismiss which did not address his months of inaction
and primarily restated the allegations in his complaint. On August 31, 2017, the District
Court dismissed Adkins’ case for failure to prosecute. Adkins timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
the District Court’s dismissal of Adkins’ complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b) for an abuse of discretion. Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 257 (3d Cir.
2008). Our review is
guided by the manner in which the trial court balanced the following factors
. . . and whether the record supports its findings: 1) the extent of the party’s
personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the
failure to meet scheduling orders and respond to discovery; (3) a history of
dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party . . . was willful or in bad
faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails
an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim
or defense.
Poulis v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). “Each factor
need not be satisfied for the trial court to dismiss a claim.” Ware v. Rodale Press, Inc.,
3

322 F.3d 218, 221 (3d Cir. 2003). Although “we defer to the District Court’s discretion,
dismissal with prejudice is only appropriate in limited circumstances and doubts should
be resolved in favor of reaching a decision on the merits.” Emerson v. Thiel Coll., 296
F.3d 184, 190 (3d Cir. 2002).
The District Court concluded that the Poulis factors weighed heavily in favor of
dismissal. First, Adkins is “solely responsible for the progress of his case,” as he
proceeded pro se. See Briscoe, 538 F.3d at 258-59. Second, Adkins’ failure to respond
to defendants’ discovery requests impeded their ability to prepare their defense and
prevented the case from moving forward. See Ware, 322 F.3d at 223. Third, Adkins had
a history of dilatoriness, repeatedly failing to participate in discovery or respond to
defendants’ motions and filings despite ample time and opportunities to do so. See
Adams v. Trs. of N.J. Brewery Emps.’ Pension Tr. Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d Cir. 1994)
(“Extensive or repeated delay or delinquency constitutes a history of dilatoriness, such as
consistent non-response to interrogatories, or consistent tardiness in complying with court
orders.”).
Fourth, the record indicates that Adkins acted willfully and in bad faith, as
demonstrated most clearly by his behavior at his deposition and his lack of explanation
for his inaction throughout the litigation in his response to the District Court’s order to
show cause. See id. at 875 (“Willfulness involves intentional or self-serving behavior.”).
Fifth, the District Court properly concluded that monetary sanctions would not have been
effective as an alternative to dismissal because Adkins proceeded in forma pauperis. See
4

Emerson, 296 F.3d at 191. The final factor was neutral because discovery had never been
completed.
The record here supports the District Court’s balancing of the Poulis factors and
its ultimate decision to dismiss Adkins’ case. Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the
District Court’s judgment.
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